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Abstract.  We report the findings of a unique nation-wide experiment to price access to U.S. 
public lands.  In 2004, the U.S. Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act mandated the 
creation of a new annual pass to cover all federal recreation sites that charge an entrance or 
access fee.  Our task was to assist federal policymakers in determining an appropriate price for 
this new pass.  Toward that end, we administered a national telephone survey to over 3,700 
households and used contingent valuation to estimate households’ willingness to pay (WTP) for 
the new pass at different prices.  Our innovative experimental design allows us to estimate three 
distinct components of hypothetical bias in order to calibrate our WTP estimates against actual 
purchasing decisions.  In a sample of the general U.S. population – most of whom have little 
experience with similar federal passes – respondents tend to greatly exaggerate their WTP for the 
pass when contrasted with previous pass sales.  A sample of recent pass purchasers, however, 
exhibits little bias, confirming other recent research showing that market experience can mitigate 
hypothetical bias.  Calibrated for bias, our results indicate that the $80 pass price ultimately 
adopted by policymakers implies an increase of nearly 2.5% in total revenue relative to the 
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1.   Introduction 
 
  This paper reports the findings of a unique nation-wide experiment to price access to U.S. 
federal lands.  The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act of 2004 mandated a new 
recreation pass (hereafter, the NRP) to replace the Golden Eagle Passport (GEP) and the 
National Parks Pass.  (For a list of acronyms used in this paper, see Table 1.)  The NRP, similar 
to the GEP, covers all federal lands that charge an entrance or access fee for recreational use. 
This includes units administered by the National Park Service, many sites administered by the 
U.S. Forest Service, and some locations administered by other federal agencies.   
  Our economic and survey research team undertook an economic analysis of the new pass 
program and submitted a price recommendation to federal land management agencies in the fall 
of 2006.  The project was completed under the constraint that the NRP should “provide 
convenient access, at a fair price, to federal recreation sites that charge fees….and should at least 
allow the government to break even in the sense that, on average, the sale of the [NRP] does not 
result in a revenue loss relative to the revenue that would be received absent the ability to 
purchase an annual pass.”
1  After receiving our analysis and price recommendation, the U.S. 
Departments of Agriculture and the Interior announced that the price for the annual NRP would 
be set at $80; the new pass went on sale in January 2007.   
  Here we describe the methodological and economic issues associated with assisting federal 
land management agencies to determine an appropriate price for the new pass.  We used 
contingent valuation (CV) methods to help determine an appropriate price for the NRP.  CV and 
                                                 
1 This should be recognized as a political constraint on the price-setting exercise; as stipulated by the sponsoring 
agencies, “revenue neutrality” was defined in relation to revenues absent any pass, not in relation to revenues from 
existing passes.  There are other possible policy issues associated with pass pricing (e.g., public education, 
congestion, pollution, deterioration of infrastructure, etc.) that were outside the scope of our current study.  Our goal 
was to provide information to help set the price of the new pass given the objective of revenue neutrality.  We 
explored neither the optimal price of the pass based on the full social costs, nor the distribution of total revenues 
across federal sites and federal land management agencies.   
  3
other stated preference valuation methods have made significant in-roads into public decision-
making over the past two decades.   Federal policymakers use the value estimates to help guide 
their decisions for a range of topics like water quality protection, air quality improvements, 
watershed and ecosystem protection, and reduced human health risk (see for example Brown, 
Champ, and Boyle, 2004).   
  In the present application, an innovative experimental design allows us to contrast the 
hypothetical purchasing decisions of survey respondents with the actual purchasing decisions of 
households.  As a result, we are less open to a major criticism of contingent valuation analysis—
hypothetical bias.  Hypothetical bias exists when people misstate their actual willingness to pay 
(WTP) in a survey.   In our analysis, we account for hypothetical decision-making because we 
are able to calibrate our new price estimates to the actual purchasing decisions of households.
2   
Unlike most other non-market valuation exercises, we have a real benchmark – the GEP.  
The GEP entitled households to basically identical access to public lands as the NRP and had 
been offered at $65 since 2000.  Using past GEP sales figures and the reported purchasing 
decisions of households within our sample, we are able to estimate three distinct components of 
hypothetical bias.  The total degree of hypothetical bias in our sampling of the U.S. general 
population (a Random Digit Dialing sample) implies that NRP revenues estimated directly from 
the uncalibrated household survey responses would be higher than actual revenues by a factor of 
16.  The total bias using our sampling of recent pass purchasers (a sample obtained from the 
                                                 
2 The topic of hypothetical bias has triggered a large literature in non-market valuation research (see Murphy et al., 
2005).  Research can be grouped into two broad categories: ex ante or ex post.   Ex ante methods frame the valuation 
question so as to make it more “real” to the person asked the valuation question, or they provide additional 
information to get people to realize that they might be overstating their actual preferences (i.e., cheap talk, see 
Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Aadland and Caplan, 2003).  Ex post techniques attempt to reduce the hypothetical 
bias by calibrating stated values to price data from real market proxies (see Champ et al., 1997; Fox et al., 1998).   
We take the ex post approach and calibrate households’ bids against actual purchasing behavior of the now-defunct 
GEP.     
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National Parks Foundation) is much lower and even slightly negative.  This finding supports 
previous research in the area of non-market valuation
3, which shows that market experience is an 
important indicator of people’s ability to accurately identify and state their true valuation for 
public and environmental goods (e.g., List and Shogren, 1998; List and Gallet, 2001; Cherry et 
al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2005; and Cherry and Shogren, 2007). 
 
2.  Background 
 
The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (Public Law 108-447, the FLREA), which 
was signed into law on December 8, 2004, established a new recreation pass to replace the 
existing GEP and National Parks Pass (NPP).  The FLREA called for a pass to provide 
convenient and fairly priced access to federal recreation sites that charge fees; to provide 
opportunities for education on federal lands; to provide support for public lands; and to develop 
partnerships with organizations that support recreation and stewardship on public lands.   
This new pass (the NRP) covers the entrance fees for units administered by the National Park 
Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as standard amenity fees for developed 
areas administered by the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau 
of Reclamation.  Fee areas generally include visitor centers or other developments with certain 
basic facilities (e.g., designated parking, restrooms, etc.).  Like the passes it replaces, the new 
pass does not cover any expanded amenity fees for such things as reservation services or 
developed campgrounds and boat launches.  When appropriate, pass holders will also continue to 
                                                 
3 While the NRP is not a “non-market good,” our results indicate that CV analyses – even those associated with 
goods and services purchased in the market – need to be interpreted with caution, especially if hypothetical bias is 
not taken into account. 
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pay special recreation permit fees such as those for motorized recreational vehicle use, 
recreational events, and group activities. 
The NRP is similar to the earlier GEP.  The GEP was introduced in 1965, at a price of $7 per 
year.  By 1997 its price had risen to $50; by 2000 the price was $65.  Like the NRP, the GEP 
provides entrance for the passholder (and other occupants of a private vehicle) to virtually all 
federal lands that charge a fee.
4  The year 2000 saw the introduction of the NPP, sold for $50 and 
providing entrance only to those federal lands administered by the National Park Service.  For an 
additional $15, a sticker could be purchased and affixed to the NPP to make it equivalent in all 
respects to the GEP (and therefore, essentially equivalent to the NRP).  Throughout this paper, 
“GEP” refers to either the Golden Eagle Passport or the National Parks Pass with sticker, while 
“NPP” refers to the National Parks Pass without the sticker.  Sales of the GEP and the NPP were 
discontinued in January of 2007 when the NRP was introduced. 
 
3.  Economic Analysis 
  Our economic analysis begins with the assumption that by stating their WTP for the NRP, 
households are revealing their optimal choice for expected number of visits to federal recreation 
sites.  This assumption provides a convenient method for calculating expected pass and gate 
revenues.  All households with a maximum WTP above the price of the NRP will purchase the 
pass and contribute exclusively to pass revenues; all households with a maximum WTP that is 
below the price of the NRP will instead pay at the gate and contribute exclusively to gate 
                                                 
4 One minor difference is that the NRP card can be signed by two adult passholders, either of whom may show the 
card to secure entrance, whereas the GEP card had space for only one signature.  As a practical matter, however, this 
difference is inconsequential, because typically the individual showing the GEP on behalf of a carload of entrants 
was not required to verify that the signature was his or hers. 
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revenues.  We can then evaluate how various NRP prices will impact total pass and gate revenues, 
and whether the prices satisfy the “revenue neutrality” constraint mentioned in Section 1. 
  The value of the NRP is derived from both use and non-use sources.  The NRP provides 
access to recreation at federal sites, without paying daily entrance or usage fees.  We refer to this 
as use value, which can in turn be separated into convenience and economic value.  Convenience 
refers to the reduced transaction costs associated with using the NRP rather than having to make 
separate payments for each entrance fee.
5  Economic value is derived from the expected cost in 
entrance fees, given the number of planned visits to recreation sites and the current entrance fee 
structure.
6  The NRP may also provide households with a sense of satisfaction in helping to fund 
the creation and maintenance of federal recreation sites that may be used by others.  We refer to 
this non-use value as stewardship value.   
  In deciding whether to purchase the NRP, households weigh all the benefits and costs.  The 
benefits include convenience, economic value, and possible stewardship motives.  The relevant 
cost is the price of the pass.  The household’s decision is straightforward – if the total benefits 
outweigh the private costs, purchase the pass; otherwise, pay the gate fees.  To better understand 
this decision, we undertook a CV experiment designed to simulate the actual market environment 
and NRP purchasing decisions. 
                                                 
5 We note that some may find an offsetting inconvenience in having to remember to bring the pass for each visit.  In 
concept, some of the values associated with “convenience” also accrue to the federal government if having a pass 
reduces wait times at entrance stations, allowing fee collectors to work more efficiently. 
6 Our discussion of the economic value of the pass assumes households base their purchasing decision on the 
expected number of recreation trips and the current gate fees, not the amount of uncertainty associated with future 
trips.  We recognize, however, that households might incorporate the option value of the pass into their decision-
making.  Similar to a real option, the NRP can be thought of as an irreversible investment under uncertainty (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994).  Once the NRP is purchased, the decision is final and irreversible because of legal restrictions 
on the resale of purchased passes.  Now suppose a household, having purchased the pass, receives an adverse shock 
(e.g., sudden loss in income, rising gasoline prices, family illness, etc.) and decides it must forgo a previously 
planned family vacation to a national park.  The household may ex post regret the decision to purchase the NRP, as 
the purchase no longer satisfies the internal cost-benefit test.  But it also seems reasonable that the household will, at 
least to some degree, anticipate this possibility ex ante and place a value on the option to delay the purchase.  While 
we do not formally model the option value for the NRP, we recognize the household will likely incorporate the 
value of delaying purchase into its stated WTP for the pass.    
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3.1 Hypothetical Bias 
  A fundamental concern of any CV study is hypothetical bias.  Respondents have a well-
established tendency to state willingness to pay values that are significantly greater than those 
revealed in real-market interactions (e.g., Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Harrison and Rutström, 
2006).  While different methods have been proposed to obtain more accurate WTP values from 
non-market valuation surveys (Boyle, 2003), our study has a built-in mechanism to calibrate 
hypothetical WTP values with real choices.  We take advantage of the fact that the NRP is nearly 
identical to the existing GEP, which was previously sold in the marketplace.  Our survey design 
(described in more detail below) uses revealed-preference data from the GEP market to generate 
calibration factors for three components of hypothetical bias within our survey sample.  We use 
these estimated calibration factors to adjust WTP values from the survey so they are consistent 
with the actual purchasing decisions of households.  The details of this calibration exercise are 
described in Sections 5.2 through 6.1. 
 
3.2 Calculating NRP and Gate Revenues 
  Initially, we assume households are motivated to purchase the NRP based solely on its 
economic value.  That is, people purchase the pass if it reduces the total planned entrance 
expenses for visitation to federal recreation sites and do not place any value on convenience or 
stewardship.  With this assumption (which we relax later), it is straightforward to use our 
estimated WTP values to project the NRP revenue and gate revenue associated with various NRP 
fee levels.  NRP revenue is defined as the revenue generated directly from sales of the NRP.  
Gate revenue is the revenue generated from on-site entrance fees at federal recreation sites.      
  To further clarify, consider the case in which a household’s maximum WTP for the NRP is 
greater than the price of the NRP.  In this case, the household purchases the pass and contributes  
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nothing to gate revenues.
7  Conversely, if the household’s maximum WTP is less than the cost of 
the NRP, the household will not purchase the pass and instead pay at the gate.  If the household’s 
WTP for the NRP is driven by economics, the most they would be willing to pay for the pass 
would be the exact amount they expect to spend at the gate.  This produces a straightforward 
method for calculating NRP and gate revenues: 
 
  NRP Revenue =  ∑
≥ ice Pr NRP WTP
ice Pr NRP                             (1.1) 
  Gate Revenues =  ∑
< ice Pr NRP WTP
WTP                            (1.2) 
  
  Total NRP revenues are calculated by multiplying NRP price by the total number of 
households with a maximum WTP greater than the price (i.e., all households that would purchase 
the pass).  Total gate revenues are calculated by summing up maximum WTP for all households 
with WTP less than the NRP price (i.e., all households that would not purchase the pass and 
instead pay at the gate).  This method for estimating total gate revenues assumes that (i) 
households do not systematically over- (or under-) estimate the number of trips to federal 
recreation sites, and (ii) they do not purchase the pass for convenience or stewardship purposes.  
The effect of relaxing these assumptions is considered at the end of Section 6.2.3.  
 
4.  Survey Design 
  Our goal with the survey was to link the NRP valuation exercise to real choices and real 
outside options; respondents answered the new valuation question after thinking about the status 
                                                 
7 Of course, the initial purchase of the pass may occur “at the gate” of a federal recreation site, but its price is not 
included in “gate revenue” as defined here.   
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quo and their familiarity with the NPP and GEP.  Our intent was to keep the survey realistic, 
simple, and quick while still generating reasonable value estimates.  Given time constraints and 
the scale of the project a face-to-face survey was infeasible.  Instead, we conducted a nationwide 
telephone survey between February and April of 2006.   
  The survey sample consisted of two independent strata.  The first stratum was sampled using 
a national Random Digit Dialing (RDD) draw of households with landline telephones.  To 
enhance the precision of estimates from this part of the sample, it was pre-stratified by the 9 
major geographic divisions defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and post-stratified to 
reflect Census Bureau distributions by geographic division, household income, Hispanic origin, 
and racial identification.  By design, this sample of 1,799 responding RDD households represents 
the roughly 110 million households in the U.S. with landline phones, except for about 30,000 
that fall into the second stratum.  The second stratum was randomly sampled from a population 
list of telephone numbers for households known to the National Parks Foundation (NPF) to have 
purchased a National Parks Pass (with or without a sticker) between April 2004 and March 2005 
(i.e., from one to two years prior to the survey).  This sample was also pre-stratified by 
geographic division, and the 1,974 responding NPF households were weighted to match the 
geographic distribution of the NPF population list.   
  The total sample size across both strata was 3,773 households.  Within-household sampling 
was not undertaken, because the relevant unit of analysis is the household.  The NRP (like the 
GEP and NPP) is not an individual pass; rather, it entitles the members of a household traveling 
together to access federal lands for recreation.  Therefore, any willing adult respondent in each 
household included in the survey was asked to provide information on behalf of the household.  
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  With total sales of approximately half a million passes per year, the NPF population list of 
only 30,629 households covers just a small subset of NPP and GEP purchasers one to two years 
earlier; obviously, it covers an even smaller fraction of all U.S. households.  The NPF sampling 
frame mainly represents households that purchased the pass on-line.  It omits most of the roughly 
50,000 annual purchasers of the GEP, except to the (unknown) extent that those on the NPF list 
may have purchased the $15 sticker that upgrades the NPP to the GEP.  Fortunately, our interest 
in the NPF sample is not predicated on claiming it represents all pass purchasers.  Rather, the 
NPF sample reflects a small but noteworthy group of supporters of the national parks (who tend 
to be familiar with the passes), while the RDD sample is designed to represent the full spectrum 
of the population of U.S. households (the majority of whom are unfamiliar with the passes). 
  Both samples were screened, through questions asked early in the survey, to eliminate from 
our analysis those households in which anyone qualified for a Golden Age or Golden Access 
Passport.  These lifetime passes, available only to senior citizens and the disabled, effectively 
remove a household from the market for an annual GEP, NPP, or NRP.  As stipulated by the 
sponsoring agencies, households that had not visited any federal recreation lands in the past two 
years were also screened out of the analysis, on the assumption they would not be part of the 
relevant market either.  Protest households (those that said they would not accept the NRP for 
free) were excluded as well, for the same reason.  After all screening, the RDD sample provided 
462 cases for analysis and the NPF sample provided 1,461 cases.
8   
                                                 
8 While larger final samples would have been desirable, the extensive screening just described was essential for 
analytic purposes.  As will be evident in the results below, both of the screened sample sizes provide adequate 
statistical power to identify as “significant” the effects central to our analysis.  The final response rates were good 
(65% for RDD and 55% for NPF, using the RR3 formula of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(2006)).  Differences between weighted and unweighted descriptive results (not shown here, but available on 
request) were small, suggesting that non-response bias was low. The weighting itself introduced little loss in 
statistical power (inflating standard errors only 7.5% in the RDD sample and less than 1% in the NPF); these power 
losses have been appropriately taken into account in our tests of statistical significance (using the method described  
  11
  The survey questionnaire began with an introduction, screening questions, and a short series 
of items about the household’s recent recreational experiences on federal lands.  (The complete 
questionnaire is available from the authors on request [and is provided as an attachment here for 
use by the reviewers].) The interviewer then asked whether the respondent was aware of the NPP 
or GEP.  If the answer was “YES”, the respondent was asked whether the household had 
purchased the NPP or GEP in the past 12 months.  
The next section of the questionnaire provided a short description of the NRP followed by 
the valuation question, which asked whether the household would be willing to buy the NRP at a 
randomly selected bid value.  For some respondents, the random bid value was the current GEP 
price, which allows us to compare hypothetical purchasing decisions to real purchasing 
decisions.  To more precisely pinpoint the valuation distribution, the interviewer then asked a 
follow-up question.  If the respondent was willing to purchase the NRP at the first bid price, we 
increased the price by a randomly set amount and asked again; if not, we lowered the price and 
asked again.   
The final section of the questionnaire asked a series of socio-demographic questions 
including age, education, race, and household income.  Table 2 presents the full set of variables 
used here, with definitions and descriptive statistics.
9  We turn now to the econometric analysis 
of the survey data. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
by Dorofeev and Grant, 2007, p. 105). Further details regarding survey design, sampling, and weighting can be 
found in (reference deleted for anonymity in the review process).  
9 Although not explicitly modeled here, a potential source of explanatory power is the distance to nearby federal 
recreation sites.  Measurement of this variable is difficult for various reasons:  (i) it would have been extremely 
difficult to identify the “nearby” federal sites relevant for each potential respondent; (ii) many federal recreation 
sites have multiple points of entry (e.g., national forests); (iii) the definition of “nearby” is arbitrary; (iv) not all 
recreation sites are equally attractive recreation areas; etc.  For these reasons, we do not include this spatial variable 
in our empirical analysis but leave it as a possible avenue for future research.     
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5.  Econometric Analysis 
  We break the econometric analysis into three sections.  In Section 5.1, we present the model 
to estimate overall WTP for the NRP.  Section 5.2 defines the model used to estimate the degree 
of hypothetical bias in terms of increased probability that a stated-preference household will 
purchase the pass at $65.  Finally, in Section 5.3, we describe how to use the two models to 
translate the probability measure into a dollar-denominated measure of hypothetical bias.  This 
scaling factor, which we term “internal” hypothetical bias, is one of three components that we 
use to calibrate the WTP estimates to the actual purchasing decisions of households.  The other 
two (“awareness” bias and “external” hypothetical bias)
10 are examined in Section 6. 
 
5.1 Overall WTP Model 
  Our first econometric model estimates WTP for the NRP, which in turn can be used to 
forecast pass and gate revenue at various NRP prices.  We use an interval regression model that 
follows directly from the double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) survey design described 
above (Hanemann et al., 1991).  An interval regression is an ordered probit model with variable 
and known cut points (Woolridge, 2002).   
  We start by writing the empirical model in terms of a household’s maximum WTP for the 
NRP, which is indirectly derived from the utility of visiting federal recreation sites:  
  
) X exp( WTP i i i ε + β ′ = ,                                                                           (3) 
 
                                                 
10 Awareness bias refers to the fact that all survey respondents were made aware of the NRP and its features before 
being asked about their willingness to purchase it, whereas a substantial fraction of households in the general 
population would likely remain unaware of the NRP’s existence (as is true of the GEP and NPP, according to our 
survey) and therefore would not have the opportunity to purchase it.  External hypothetical bias refers to the 
remaining difference between hypothetical and actual WTP once internal and awareness bias are taken into account.   
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where WTPi is the latent willingness to pay for the NRP; Xi is a vector of explanatory variables; β 
is a vector of coefficients; εi is a mean-zero Gaussian error term with variance σ
2; and i = 1,..,N 
indexes households in a sample of size N.  The exponential functional form guarantees the 
predicted WTP will be non-negative.  Given expression (3), the probability of purchasing the 
pass is represented as 
 
))) b ln( X (
1
( ) b WTP Pr( ) 1 y Pr( P i i i i i i − β ′
σ
Φ = ≥ = = = ,                               (4) 
 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function, yi = 1 if the household purchased 
the pass, yi = 0 if the household did not purchase the pass, and bi is the proposed price of the 
NRP.  The initial bids are chosen at random from the following bid vector (which we developed 
using focus groups): 
 
b = ($25, 45, 65, 85, 105, 125, 145, 165).                   (5) 
 
Table 3 shows the percent of the RDD and NPF samples that respond “YES” to the initial 
bids.  As expected, the percent responding “YES” generally declines as the bids increase in 
value, and the NPF respondents are more likely to say “YES” at every bid price.  As described in 
Section 4, we follow the initial bid with a second one, randomly selected from either                 
b
H = (b+$20, 2b-$5) if the respondent accepts the first bid or b
L = (b-$20, 0.5(b+$5)) if the 
respondent declines.
11  If a respondent answers “NO” to both bids, we ask another follow-up 
                                                 
11 In other words, if the initial bid price is accepted, the second price is (randomly) either $20 higher, or else (with 
equal probability) it is approximately double the initial bid amount.  If the initial price is declined, the second price 
is either $20 lower, or else it is approximately half the initial amount.  Adjustments of $5 (when doubling or halving  
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question with a bid equal to zero, in order to identify protest bidders.  Given (3), the probabilities 
of purchasing a pass within each possible range of prices are  
 
  0 ) 0 WTP Pr( P i 1 i = < < −∞ =                               (6.1) 




i i 2 i P )) X ) b (ln(
1
( ) b WTP 0 Pr( P − β ′ −
σ
Φ = ≤ ≤ =                        (6.2) 
)) X ) b (ln(
1
( )) X ) b (ln(
1
( ) b WTP b Pr( P i
L
i i i i i
L
i 3 i β ′ −
σ
Φ − β ′ −
σ
Φ = ≤ < =                   (6.3) 
)) X ) b (ln(
1
( )) X ) b (ln(
1




i i i 4 i β ′ −
σ
Φ − β ′ −
σ
Φ = ≤ < =                         (6.4) 
) P P P P ( 1 P 4 i 3 i 2 i 1 i 5 i + + + − = .                             (6.5) 
 
The log likelihood function is then given by 
 




1 j ij ij ) , ( P ln ) , ( L ln ,                     (7) 
 
where ωij is a binary variable equal to one if household i chooses category j.  We choose β and σ 
to maximize the likelihood function.  With estimates of β and σ in hand, we form WTP estimates 
for every household in the sample, and in turn the NRP and gate revenue functions.     
  Table 4 presents the results from the DBDC model.  We analyze the RDD and NPF samples 
separately throughout, because the two populations are substantially different in their 
demographic characteristics (e.g., NPF respondents tend to be older, with more education and 
higher income), in their visitation to federal recreation sites, and of course, in their recent 
purchases of federal recreation passes.  Protest households (i.e., those who refuse the pass for 
                                                                                                                                                             
the initial amount) ensure that all bids are multiples of 5, to avoid any confounding that might arise if multiples of 
10 have a different psychological resonance with respondents.   
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free) are excluded from all analyses, based on the original screening decision to exclude 
households that are unlikely to participate in the market for the NRP.  As compared to the rest of 
the sample, protest households (N=67 for RDD; N=30 for NPF) tend to be older, less educated, 
lower income, less likely to be white, and more likely to reside in states in the northeast (NJ, NY 
and PA) or great plains (IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE and SD).   
  We incorporate heteroscedasticity into the econometric model because the WTP bid intervals 
vary across households.  Recall that half of our follow-up bids are either half or twice the initial 
bid, so higher initial bids tend to be associated with larger WTP intervals.  We use the initial bid 
to proxy for interval width and model the heteroscedasticity as 
 
   ) b exp( i 1 0
2
i α + α = σ .                        (8) 
 
As shown in Table 4, the test statistic for heteroscedasticity is large in the NPF sample, leading 
us to reject the null of homoscedastic errors there, but not in the RDD sample. 
  Mean and median WTP figures are presented at the bottom of Table 4.  The mean and 
median WTP values for the RDD sample are approximately $42 and $35, indicating a WTP 
distribution that is slightly skewed toward higher WTP values.  The mean and median WTP 
values for the NPF sample are both approximately $95, an average substantially higher than in 
the RDD sample, which is expected given that the NPF sample is comprised of recent pass 
purchasers.
12  Next, we consider hypothetical bias. 
                                                 
12 Given the debate regarding the DBDC model (Herriges and Shogren, 1996; Whitehead, 2002), we also estimated 
a single-bounded dichotomous-choice (SBDC) WTP model (results available on request from the authors).  In the 
NPF sample, the predicted WTP distributions and coefficient estimates from the SBDC model are similar to the 
results from the DBDC model.  For the RDD sample, the calibrated mean and median WTP from the SBDC model 
are approximately $7 lower than from the DBDC model, and the coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar.  
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5.2 Modeling Internal Hypothetical Bias
13 
  We now describe the econometric procedure to calibrate estimated WTP to be consistent 
with stated rates of GEP purchases from within our two survey samples.  We designed our 
valuation experiment to account for hypothetical bias by comparing hypothetical decisions to 
buy the NRP (at a bid equal to $65) with actual decisions to purchase the existing GEP, which 
has been sold for $65 in the marketplace since 2000.  Assuming households are accurately 
stating whether or not they purchased the GEP within the immediately preceding 12 months, this 
internal calibration should result in WTP and revenue estimates that more nearly reflect the 
actual purchasing decisions of households in the general U.S. population. 
  To estimate the degree of internal hypothetical bias in the survey data, we specify a probit 
model with a dummy variable to capture the difference between hypothetical and actual 
purchasing decisions.  Within the RDD and NPF samples taken separately, we pool data from 
two distinct subsamples—the stated preference and the revealed preference subsamples.  The 
revealed preference subsample includes every household who knew of the $65 GEP, whether or 
not they had purchased one.  The stated preference subsample includes every household that was 
unaware of the GEP and received an initial bid of $65 for the NRP, whether or not they said 
“YES” to that bid.  Protest households (who refused the pass for free) are excluded from the 
analysis.
14 
  The underlying economic model is similar to (3) but modified to incorporate hypothetical 
bias 
                                                 
13 The estimation of what we call “internal” hypothetical bias in this section follows Aadland and Caplan (2003).  
Because our estimation of internal hypothetical bias captures any difference between stated and revealed 
preferences, it will include other differences such as strategic bias.  Strategic bias occurs when households 
intentionally say ‘NO’ to an acceptable bid in order to encourage policymakers to set a lower price. 
14 We also excluded 61 and 336 revealed-preference households in the RDD and NPF samples who were aware of 
the policy that allowed receipts from recent entrance fees to federal recreation sites to be applied toward the cost of 
the NPP or GEP.  This was done to level the playing field because this unpublicized “receipt policy” may alter the 
value of a pass and was not described to survey respondents.  
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  ) X exp( ) SP exp( ) SP X exp( WTP i i i i i i i ε + β ′ ⋅ δ = ε + ⋅ δ + β ′ = ,                       (9) 
 
where WTPi is unobserved willingness to pay for either the GEP or the NRP, SPi is a dummy 
variable equal to one for the stated-preference subsample and zero for the revealed-preference 
subsample, and δ is the hypothetical bias coefficient.  Analyzing the RDD and NPF samples 
separately, we form the probability (Pi) that the i
th household purchases the pass at a price of $65: 
 
))) 65 ln($ SP X (
1
( ) 65 $ WTP Pr( P i i i i − ⋅ δ + β ′
σ
Φ = ≥ =  .                              (10) 
 
Let yi = 1 indicate the household purchased the pass (either hypothetical or real), and let yi = 0 
indicate they did not purchase the pass.  This is a probit model with (log) likelihood function  
 
[] ∑ = − − + = δ β
N
1 i i i i i ) P 1 ln( ) y 1 ( ) P ln( y ) X , y | , ( L ln .                         (11) 
 
 The  coefficients  β and δ are only identifiable up to the scale factor (1/ ).  Because β and δ 
only show up in the likelihood function as a ratio with   (i.e., (β/ ) and (δ/ )) and the price is 
fixed at $65, it is impossible to disentangle the ratios and obtain individual estimates of β, δ and 
 .  However, the marginal effects, which measure the change in probability for a one unit change 
in the explanatory variables (X or SP), only depend on the identifiable ratios.  For the average 
household, the marginal effect for hypothetical bias is 
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  () () ) / ( X ) / ( ) / ( X
) 0 SP , X | 1 y Pr( ) 1 SP , X | 1 y Pr(
σ β ′ Φ − σ δ + σ β ′ Φ =
= = − = = = Δ
                                    (12) 
 
where a bar over the variable represents its average value.  This coefficient is defined in terms of 
increased (or decreased) probability of pass purchase.  In the next section, we describe how to 
translate Δ into a WTP scale factor using the baseline DBDC model. 
 
5.3 Translating Internal Hypothetical Bias from a Probability into Dollars 
  The coefficient of hypothetical bias Δ in expression (12) is measured in terms of probability 
the pass is purchased.  Although this provides evidence of hypothetical bias, it does not allow 
household WTP and welfare measures to be directly adjusted to reflect revealed preferences.  
Furthermore, the probit model shown in expression (10) does not identify a dollar amount of 
hypothetical bias because the bids are not varied (i.e., the bid is fixed at $65).  Fortunately, the 
DBDC model described in Section 5.1 uses the entire bid vector and allows us to identify 
household WTP.   
  We use the normal distribution along with estimates of β and                 $65  to 
back out the WTP hypothetical bias scale factor consistent with Δ for the average household.
15  
This is accomplished by solving for δ (given estimates of β,    , and Δ) from the following 
equation: 
 
                                                 
15 Estimates for   are formed using                 $65  for both the RDD and NPF samples even though we 
do not find evidence of heteroscedasticity in the RDD sample (see Table 4).  The RDD results that follow are 
qualitatively similar if the errors are instead assumed to be homoscedastic.   
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> − > = Δ
 
                                                  (13)  
 
Figure 1a illustrates the procedure for identifying exp(δ), the WTP scale factor for hypothetical 
bias for the RDD sample, while Figure 1b illustrates the procedure using the NPF sample.  The 
procedure is the same for each sample, but the figures are drawn separately to reflect the position 
and shape of the empirical WTP distributions for each sample.   
We start with our estimate of hypothetical bias, Δ, which is measured in terms of the 
increased probability the NRP is purchased.  This value is estimated using the method outlined in 
Section 5.2 and is represented by the etched area in Figure 1a.  (In Figure 1b it is the difference 
between areas H and A.)  The area under the hypothetical WTP distribution to the right of 
ln($65) is the probability that a household will hypothetically accept a $65 bid for the NRP; the 
area under the actual WTP distribution to the right of ln($65) is the probability that a household 
will actually purchase the NRP at a $65 price.  The difference between the two probabilities is Δ.  
Assuming a normal distribution, we then back out the unique value of δ that positions the 
hypothetical WTP distribution to be consistent with Δ and the standard deviation    .  Finally, we 
use the corresponding WTP scale factor, exp(δ), to form the internally calibrated WTP estimates 
[WTPi / exp(δ)] that more accurately reflect actual purchasing decisions of households.    
  We now turn our attention to the results from the hypothetical bias model outlined above, 
estimated separately for the RDD and NPF samples.  The first row of Table 5 presents the 
coefficient and marginal effect (ME) estimates for hypothetical bias.  In both samples, the 
hypothetical bias coefficients are positive and statistically significant.  The ME estimates 
indicate that, all else equal, the average RDD and NPF stated-preference households are 13.6 and  
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12.6 percentage points more likely to purchase a hypothetical $65 NRP than similar revealed-
preference households are to have purchased the actual $65 GEP.  The control variables include 
demographics such as age, gender, education, race and region.    
  As discussed above, the estimates of Δ need to be translated from a probability into a WTP 
scale factor (i.e., we need to map our estimates of Δ into estimates of exp(δ) for the purpose of 
calibrating the WTP estimates for hypothetical bias).  To accomplish this, we use the baseline 
DBDC estimates reported in Table 4.  The estimated value for the hypothetical bias calibration 
factor, exp(δ), is approximately 1.4 and 1.3 for the RDD and NPF samples.  Table 6 reports the 
details for this calculation.  Put differently, the dollar values for WTP in the RDD and NPF 
samples need to be reduced by 40% and 30% to be consistent with the observation that stated-
preference households are 13.6 and 12.6 percentage points more likely than revealed-preference 
households to purchase a pass at $65.  The revenue functions reported below are therefore scaled 
by exp(δ) to more accurately reflect actual purchasing decisions.  
However, these estimates of hypothetical bias are likely to be lower bounds on the true total 
bias in the population.  To estimate internal hypothetical bias, the sample was partitioned 
according to whether respondents were aware of the GEP (revealed-preference households) or 
not aware of the GEP (stated-preference households, if they received a $65 bid for the NRP).  If 
lack of awareness of the GEP is associated with a lower propensity to visit federal recreation 
sites (and therefore a lower WTP for the NRP), then our stated-preference households are, all 
else equal, less likely to hypothetically purchase a pass at any given price.  This will lead to an 
underestimate of internal hypothetical bias by the method just described.  Accordingly, we next 
augment our calibration to include an explicit adjustment for awareness bias and a final 
“external” adjustment using data on aggregate actual sales of the GEP.      
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6.   Estimated Revenue Functions 
  In this section, we describe the calibration process and present the resulting NRP and gate 
revenue functions.  We calculate both parametric and non-parametric estimates of the revenue 
functions.  The parametric estimates of the revenue functions are based on the DBDC model and 
methods outlined in Section 5.1.  The non-parametric estimates of the revenue functions are a 
direct reflection of households’ “YES” or “NO” responses to the various bids presented in the 
CV analysis.  For simplicity, we focus on the non-parametric estimates and make the parametric 
estimates available upon request.
16  
 
6.1 Calibration for Awareness, Internal, and External Hypothetical Bias  
 
  All the revenue functions are first calibrated for awareness bias.  Approximately 50% of the 
RDD sample and 4% of the NPF sample were unaware of both the NPP and GEP.
17  Assuming 
the NRP is marketed in a similar manner, we expect similar fractions of the respective 
populations would not purchase the NRP at any price, simply because they would not learn of its 
existence.  To account for this in our population revenue projections, we calculate NRP revenues 
in the sample by summing NRP revenues only for those who were aware of either the NPP or the 
GEP and have a maximum WTP that is higher than the proposed NRP price.  We then scale that 
amount up to the appropriate population size.  Estimated gate revenues do include households 
                                                 
16 The primary difference between the estimates is that the non-parametric model has more success predicting the 
small number of households that place themselves at the tails of the WTP distributions (see Greene (2003), page 
685).  Although the revenue functions tend to have a similar shape, the peak revenue occurs at a substantially lower 
price for the parametric estimates.        
17 The NPF sample consists of telephone numbers that had belonged to households purchasing the National Parks 
Pass from one to two years before the survey was conducted.  Some of those telephone numbers may no longer 
belong to the households that bought the pass, and respondents reached at those numbers might be unaware of both 
the NPP and the GEP.  
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who were unaware of both the NPP and the GEP, under the assumption such households would 
continue to visit federal recreation sites and pay gate fees.   
  After adjusting for awareness bias, we calibrate sequentially for what we term internal and 
external hypothetical bias.  The internal calibration procedure uses the sample RDD and NPF 
survey data and is outlined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.  Unlike other valuation studies, however, our 
research design permits a further important adjustment: using external information to calibrate 
our WTP estimates against actual purchasing decisions in the aggregate.  Our external calibration 
uses outside information on recent pass revenues to project future pass revenues and then 
matches them to projected NRP revenues.  As a consequence, the external calibration adjusts for 
any remaining hypothetical bias not addressed by the awareness or internal hypothetical bias 
adjustments.   
  Based on recent pass sales, we project that at a price of $65, NRP revenues should be 
approximately $30 million and $1 million for the RDD and NPF populations.
18  After 
adjustments to WTP for awareness bias and internal hypothetical bias, we then scale the 
corresponding NRP revenues to match these figures.  Because gate revenues are calculated from 
NRP revenues, they are automatically calibrated in a similar fashion.   
Table 7 presents the magnitudes of all three types of calibration factors.  Panel A shows the 
projected NRP revenues based on various assumptions about awareness and hypothetical bias in 
the relevant populations.  Panel B presents total scaling factors and their decomposition into 
                                                 
18 In 2005, there were approximately 460,000 National Parks Passes sold (at $50), plus 54,000 Golden Eagle 
Passports ($65), together generating revenue of $26.5 million, a total that had increased by an average of 15% per 
year since 2001 (reference deleted for anonymity).  Extrapolating the increase even one year would yield pass 
revenue in excess of $30 million for the general population.  Partial data on actual NRP sales during the first nine 
months of 2007 have now confirmed $30 million as an appropriate benchmark figure (U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 2008). The $1 million figure for the NPF population takes into account our survey results showing that just 
over half of NPF pass purchasers in 2004 bought the GEP in 2005 (0.5 × 30629 × $65 = $1 million).  For purposes 
of calibrating NRP revenue, these figures are conservative, in the sense that they seem more likely too low than too 
high; if so, NRP revenue will be underestimated in our analysis (and external hypothetical bias will be overstated).      
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awareness bias, internal hypothetical bias and external hypothetical bias.  In calculating the total 
bias, the decomposed terms are multiplied together, rather than added, to be consistent with the 
multiplicative hypothetical bias term in equation (9).  By decomposing the total bias in a 
multiplicative fashion, each individual bias term retains the interpretation of a ‘scaling factor’. 
The scaling factors in Panel B are calculated using the revenue projections in Panel A.  First, 
the scaling factors for awareness bias are calculated by taking the ratio of predicted NRP 
revenues at $65 (assuming all households in the population will be made aware of the NRP) to 
the predicted NRP revenues at $65 (assuming that households in the population will be aware of 
the NRP at the same rate as our sample was aware of the GEP or NPP).  Second, maintaining the 
correction for awareness bias, the internal hypothetical bias scaling factor is calculated by taking 
the ratio of predicted NRP revenues at $65 (without a correction for internal hypothetical bias) to 
predicted NRP revenues at $65 (after scaling WTP by exp(δ)).  Finally, the external bias factor is 
calculated by taking the ratio of projected revenues at $65 (with adjustments for awareness and 
internal hypothetical bias) to the benchmark revenues mentioned above ($30 million and $1 
million for the RDD and NPF populations). 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the total degree of awareness and hypothetical bias.  Using the 
RDD sample and the non-parametric forecasts, the uncalibrated NRP revenues are approximately 
16 times higher than the calibrated data would suggest.  Using the parametric forecasts, the bias 
in the uncalibrated RDD results is only half as large, and it is completely eliminated by just the 
awareness and internal calibrations. 
The total bias using the NPF sample is much lower (perhaps negligible for some purposes), 
and even slightly negative in the non-parametric case.  This suggests the overall hypothetical 
bias for the general public RDD sample is greater than the bias for the more pass-experienced  
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NPF sample.  The result also confirms previous empirical and meta-analysis research that market 
experience helps mitigate valuation biases (e.g., List and Shogren, 1998; List and Gallet, 2001; 
Cherry et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2005; Cherry and Shogren, 2007). 
 
6.2 Projected Revenue Functions 
  Next we present non-parametric, calibrated estimates for NRP and gate revenues.
19   
 
6.2.1 NRP Revenue 
  As shown in Table 8, the NRP revenue functions reach maximums at approximately $25 and 
$45 for the RDD and NPF samples.  For the RDD sample, NRP revenues drop sharply at $45 and 
then level off up to $105, after which pass revenues again begin to fall more rapidly.  In the NPF 
sample, the decline in pass revenues after the peak is steady out to $265.  The degree of 
sensitivity of NRP revenues to price reflects the elasticity of the underlying demand curve for the 
NRP.  Recall, all these revenue functions are calibrated for awareness, hypothetical and external 
bias as described in Section 6.1.   
 
6.2.2 Gate Revenue 
  Table 8 also shows gate revenues.  We project the level of gate revenues based on 
households’ maximum WTP for the NRP (i.e., the most households should be willing to pay for 
the NRP is the amount they expect to spend at the gate).  At low NRP prices, gate revenues are 
                                                 
19 We calculate the non-parametric revenue functions by assuming the household’s true WTP is at the midpoint of 
the chosen bid interval.  Households that answer “YES” to both bids are assigned a WTP equal to $10 plus the high 
bid.  Households that answer “NO” to both bids, but “YES” when asked if they would accept the new pass for free, 
are assigned a WTP equal to half the lower bid.  Those that reject both bids, and also say they would not accept the 
pass for free (67 households in the RDD sample and 30 in the NPF sample), are treated as protest bidders and are 
omitted from the analysis.  
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relatively low and consist primarily of households that are unaware of the pass program and thus 
pay at the gate.
20  As the NRP price goes up, gate revenues increase as households with a 
maximum WTP less than the pass price choose instead to pay at the gate.  Gate revenues flatten 
out at their maximum level once the NRP price reaches about $150 for the RDD sample and 
about $200 for the NPF sample.  At these higher-end prices, there are few predicted NRP 
purchasers remaining. 
     
6.2.3 Revenue Neutrality 
  Recall from Section 1 that one goal established for the NRP was that the selected price must 
be “revenue neutral”.  As defined by the sponsoring agencies, revenue neutrality implies that the 
price of the NRP should not result in substantial revenue losses relative to the revenue that would 
be received absent the ability to purchase an annual pass.  The revenue losses from pricing the 
NRP are straightforward to calculate.  The revenues absent the pass are given by the gate 
revenues at the bottom of the table (i.e., at a sufficiently high price that no households purchase 
the pass).  The $254 million and $2.9 million in gate revenues for the RDD and NPF samples, 
absent a pass, can then be compared to the total NRP plus gate revenues at lower NRP prices.  
The results in Table 8 suggest that the price would need to be set well above the recent GEP 
price of $65 to avoid sacrificing substantial revenues.  As the NRP price increases, we approach 
“revenue neutrality” near a price of about $150 for the RDD sample and $200 for the NPF 
sample.  Interestingly, the cost of an annual pass for California’s state parks in 2006 was $125; 
                                                 
20 Projected gate revenues are based on the assumption that the fraction of unaware households in the population 
does not vary with the NRP price.  We recognize that this assumption is questionable at low NRP prices (i.e., word 
is likely to spread fast if the NRP price is set at or near zero).  These low prices, however, are also likely to be 
outside the practical range for public policy, and little or no attention need be given to the extremes of any of the 
revenue functions.    
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the cost of an annual pass in 2006 for Parks Canada was $US140.  However, at NRP prices of 
$150 or higher, few U.S. households would purchase the pass. 
  In all of our results so far, we assume that households are motivated to purchase the NRP 
based on its economic value.  That is, people purchase the NRP pass because doing so results in a 
savings in expected at-the-gate expenses for visiting federal recreation sites.  This assumption 
has some empirical support:  in our survey, 83% of the RDD sample (and more than 90% of the 
NPF sample) say that “the number of times the household expects to visit federal lands” and “the 
price of the pass compared to the cost of entrance fees” are important reasons to purchase the 
pass.  But there are other reasons a household may purchase the pass.  First, the household may 
receive convenience value, which refers to the reduced transaction costs associated with using 
the NRP rather than having to make separate payments for each entrance fee.  A substantial 
fraction of the RDD sample (76%) states that “the convenience of one annual pass” is important.  
That figure is even higher in the NPF sample (94%).  There may also be stewardship value, if the 
household views the NRP as a method for contributing to the maintenance and improvement of 
federal lands and facilities.  And households may systematically over-estimate the number of 
expected trips to federal recreation sites (or the associated entry fees).  Any of these factors, and 
perhaps others, might encourage households to purchase the NRP at a greater rate than the basic 
“economic” assumption would imply.  Consequently, our estimates to this point represent a 
lower bound on the demand for the NRP pass based on economic considerations.   
  We believe the economic rationale for purchasing the pass is reasonable.  However, the open-
ended survey questions reveal a few households do express stewardship concerns.  Furthermore, 
in the parametric model the coefficient for ALL REVENUE, which could be considered a weak 
proxy for stewardship, is a positive and statistically significant predictor of WTP.  In addition,  
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the survey results show that average “expected” numbers of trips within the next year (3.52 and 
4.77 for RDD and NPF) are slightly higher than average numbers of “typical” trips (3.42 and 
4.65).  The direction of these small differences is consistent with some over-estimation of trips.
21   
  To explore these possibilities, we allow a portion of the WTP for the NRP to be derived from 
convenience, stewardship concerns, trip over-estimation, and/or other “non-economic” factors.  
For example, if 40% or more of WTP is derived from these non-economic factors then rather 
than being a revenue loser, the NRP program is predicted to become a revenue generator for 
NRP prices greater than $60.
22  However, it seems unlikely that anything close to 40% of the 
value of the NRP is due to stewardship or other non-economic factors, especially given our 
survey results showing limited evidence of stewardship purchasers and little systematic over-
estimation of visitation.   
      
7.   Concluding Remarks  
Stated preference valuation methods have made significant in-roads into public decision-
making over the past two decades.  Federal policymakers use the value estimates to help guide 
their decisions for a range of topics like water quality protection, air quality improvements, 
watershed and ecosystem protection, and reduced human health risk (see for example Brown, 
Champ, and Boyle, 2004).  Here we have described our use of contingent valuation to assist U.S. 
federal land management agencies to determine an appropriate price for a new pass providing 
access to all federal recreational lands.  This unique project was spurred by the U.S. Federal 
Lands Recreation Enhancement Act of 2004, which authorized a new pass to replace the existing 
Golden Eagle Passport and the National Parks Pass.  The question we addressed was evaluating 
                                                 
21 Using a paired t test, the differences are statistically significant for the NPF sample but only at the 10% 
significance level. 
22 The estimation results are omitted to conserve space but are available from the authors upon request.  
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how much to charge for the new recreation pass given the preferences of the general public and 
the revenue-neutrality constraint of the federal agencies.  We designed and administered a 
contingent valuation survey to over 3,700 households in two samples to estimate willingness to 
pay for the new pass at a variety of prices.   
Our experimental design allows us to estimate the degree of hypothetical bias in the sample 
and to calibrate our WTP estimates to reflect actual purchasing decisions.  We find the general 
U.S. population – most of whom have little experience with similar federal passes – tend to 
greatly exaggerate their WTP for the pass when contrasted with previous pass sales.  A sample of 
recent pass purchasers, however, exhibits little hypothetical bias, supporting the idea that market 
experience can substantially mitigate bias in WTP estimates.   Accounting for the hypothetical 
bias, our results suggest that to maintain the “revenue neutrality” target desired by the federal 
agencies, the NRP price would have to be nearly $150 for the general population sample. 
After receiving our results and conclusions, the federal government officially announced the 
new recreation pass in December 2006.  The price of the new pass, named the America the 
Beautiful Pass, was set at $80.  According to our estimates, this price implies an approximate 
$11 million loss in revenue annually, or 4.5% of total pass and gate revenues at that price.  
However, it does come almost $6 million (nearly 2.5% of total revenue) closer to revenue 
neutrality than the $65 price of the Golden Eagle Passport.  Federal policymakers ultimately 
decided that $11 million in forgone revenue was preferable to the adverse public reaction that 
would likely have greeted a new pass priced at more than double the National Parks Pass or 
Golden Eagle Passport.  
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 Table 1. Acronyms Used in the Text 
Acronym Full  Expression 
CV Contingent  Valuation 
DBDC  Double-Bounded Dichotomous Choice 
FLREA  Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act  
GEP   Golden Eagle Passport  
(and/or National Parks Pass with sticker) 
ME Marginal  Effect 
NPF  National Parks Foundation 
NPP  National Parks Pass 
NRP  New Recreation Pass 
RDD  Random Digit Dialing 
SBDC  Single-Bounded Dichotomous Choice 
WTP  Willingness to Pay  
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(N = 462) 
NPF Sample 
(N = 1461) 
Initial Bid  First bid chosen randomly from 
{$25,$45,$65,$85,$105,$125,$145,$165}  93.615 96.691 
All Revenue 
1 if household is more likely to purchase pass if 
all money was used for services and facilities 
on federal recreation sites; 0 otherwise 
0.628 0.636 
Low Visits 
1 if number of visits last year to  
Federal recreation sites ≤ 3, 0 otherwise 
0.803 0.453 
Young   1 if 17 < Age < 30; 0 otherwise  0.149  0.138 
Old  1 if 50 < Age < 60; 0 otherwise  0.242  0.300 
Male  1 if Male; 0 otherwise  0.433  0.477 
BS degree  1 if BS degree or some graduate school; 0 otherwise  0.357  0.394 
Professional degree  1 if Graduate or professional degree; 0 otherwise  0.236  0.353 
Low Income  1 if Household income is less than $50K; 0 otherwise 0.321  0.255 
Hispanic  1 if Hispanic; 0 otherwise  0.056  0.027 
White  1 if White; 0 otherwise  0.846  0.876 
Asian  1 if Asian; 0 otherwise  0.011  0.026 
African American  1 if African American; 0 otherwise  0.024  0.003 
NE  1 if states (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT);  
NE = 0 otherwise  0.048 0.079 
ENC  1 if states (NJ, NY, PA); ENC = 0 otherwise  0.113  0.117 
WNC  1 if states (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI); WNC = 0 otherwise  0.160  0.155 
GP  1 if states (IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, SD);  
GP = 0 otherwise  0.071 0.082 
SE  1 if states (DC, DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV); 
SE = 0 otherwise  0.165 0.177 
WSC  1 if states (AL, KY, MS, TN); WSC = 0 otherwise  0.065  0.025 
SW  1 if states (AR, LA, OK, TX); SW = 0 otherwise  0.067  0.071 
RM  1 if states (AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, WY);  
RM = 0 otherwise  0.097 0.109 
PC  1 if states (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA); PC = 0 otherwise  0.214  0.185  
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 Table 3. Percent Responding “YES” to Initial Referendum 
RDD Sample (N = 462)  NPF Sample (N = 1461) 
Price  Percent Responding 
“YES”  Price  Percent Responding 
“YES” 
25 55.5%  25 89.4% 
45 38.3%  45 79.0% 
65 22.4%  65 60.2% 
85 22.0%  85 45.4% 
105 19.4%  105 33.9% 
125 10.5%  125 22.8% 
145 12.7%  145 22.3% 
165 13.5%  165 13.6% 
Notes.  Protest households (67 in RDD sample and 30 in NPF sample) have been omitted.    
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Table 4. DBDC WTP Estimates for the NRP 
Explanatory Variables
† 
RDD Sample  NPF Sample 
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P  –Value 
All Revenue  0.52***  0.00  0.12***  0.00 
Low Visits  -0.40***  0.01  -0.11***  0.00 
Young 0.12  0.28  -0.09*  0.07 
Old -0.01  0.47  -0.04**  0.04 
Male -0.09  0.26  -0.08**  0.02 
BS degree  0.17  0.17  0.05  0.15 
Professional degree  0.08  0.34 0.09** 0.05 
Low Income  -0.10  0.29  -0.19***  0.00 
White 0.06  0.43  -0.02  0.39 
Hispanic 0.77**  0.03  0.07  0.31 
Asian 0.62  0.14  -0.16  0.12 
African American  -0.66  0.10  0.32  0.14 
NE -0.24  0.24  0.02  0.38 
ENC -0.23  0.19  -0.03  0.34 
WNC -0.40**  0.05  -0.04  0.27 
GP -0.18  0.28  -0.12*  0.09 
SE -0.07  0.39  -0.02  0.34 
WSC -0.40  0.12  -0.06  0.31 
SW 0.02  0.47  0.04  0.30 
RM 0.21  0.21  0.05  0.21 
Heteroscedasticity (H
d) Results 
Constant -0.22  0.24  -0.57***  0.00 
Initial Bid  0.003  0.21  -0.01***  0.00 
H
d Likelihood Ratio  0.76  0.38  14.34***  0.00 
Summary Statistics 
Sample Size  462  1461 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic  45.97***  65.07*** 
Mean WTP  $42.28  $94.52 
Median WTP  $34.93  $95.63 
Notes.  (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.  The 
estimation was carried out using the Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML 2.0) package in 
Gauss version 3.5.  The nonlinear optimization routine was Newton-Raphson with a convergence 
criterion of 1×10
-5 for the gradient of the coefficients.  The estimates for “don’t know” and 
“missing” dummy variables are not shown.  
†Although not explicitly listed as an explanatory 
variable, the bids are incorporated through the probabilities (see equation 6) and the likelihood 
function (see equation 7).  See Cameron and James [1987] for further details.  Protest households 





 Table 5. Hypothetical Bias Probit Model 
Explanatory 
Variables 
RDD Sample (N = 180)  NPF Sample (N = 830) 
Mean  Coefficient P –Value ME  Mean  Coefficient  P –Value ME 
Hypothetical  0.082 1.362*** 0.001  0.136  0.039  0.348**  0.034  0.126 
All Revenue  0.628  -0.177  0.338  -0.007  0.636  0.030  0.376  0.012 
Low Visits  0.803  -1.329*** 0.006  -0.131  0.453  -0.409***  0.000  -0.157 
Young 0.149  0.580  0.181  0.038  0.138  -0.055  0.346  -0.021 
Old 0.242  -0.400  0.223  -0.014  0.300  0.177**  0.044  0.067 
Male 0.433  -0.517  0.124  -0.022  0.477  0.062  0.252  0.024 
BS degree  0.357  0.537  0.158  0.026  0.394  0.093  0.210  0.036 
Professional degree  0.236  0.068  0.455 0.003 0.353  0.129 0.144 0.049 
Low Income  0.312  -0.400  0.221  -0.019  0.255  0.054  0.361  0.020 
White 0.846  -0.577  0.174  -0.038  0.877  0.224*  0.080  0.087 
NE 0.048  0.168  0.443  0.008  0.079  -0.475***  0.008  -0.187 
ENC 0.113  0.178  0.391  0.008  0.117  -0.297**  0.038  -0.117 
WNC 0.160  0.117  0.432  0.005  0.155  -0.375**  0.012  -0.147 
GP 0.071  0.122  0.438  0.005  0.082  -0.730***  0.000  -0.285 
SE 0.165  -0.187  0.391  -0.007  0.177  -0.307**  0.018  -0.120 
WSC 0.065  -3.832  0.494  -0.032  0.025  -0.471**  0.046  -0.186 
SW 0.067  -1.256  0.100  -0.020  0.071  -0.353**  0.039  -0.139 
RM 0.097  -1.114  0.151  -0.022  0.109  -0.171  0.147  -0.067 
Constant  1.000 3.535*** 0.000  --  1.000  0.435**  0.037  -- 
Notes.  (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.  The estimation was carried out 
using the Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML 2.0) package in Gauss version 3.5.  The nonlinear optimization routine 
was Newton-Raphson with a convergence criterion of 1×10
-5 for the gradient of the coefficients.  The estimates for “don’t 
know” and “missing” dummy variables are not shown.  ME = Marginal Effect.  26 and 17 protest households (those that 









Table 6. Information Used in Solving for the Internal Hypothetical Bias Factor from Equation (13) 
Estimate  RDD Sample  NPF Sample 
Δ  0.136 0.126 
       exp         $65  0.985 0.628 
X β ′   3.748 4.536 
Equation (13):    ))) 65 ln($ X (
ˆ
1
( ))) 65 ln($ X (
ˆ
1
( − β ′
σ
Φ − − δ + β ′
σ
Φ = Δ  
δ  0.348 0.272 
exp(δ)  1.416 1.313 
Notes.  Φ ≡ standard normal cumulative distribution function.   
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Table 7. Awareness, Internal Hypothetical Bias and External Hypothetical Bias Calibration Factors 
Panel A.  NRP Revenue Predictions 
Type of Calibration 
 Predicted NRP Revenue ($65 × Millions of Households Purchasing NRP) 
RDD Sample  NPF Sample 
Non-Parametric Parametric  Non-Parametric Parametric 
Uncalibrated 491.14  254.63  0.88  1.40 
Awareness Calibration  
Only  187.63 102.75  0.85  1.35 
Awareness & Internal 
Calibrations  143.48 26.80  0.53  1.02 
All Calibrations  30.00  30.00  1.00  1.00 
Panel B.  Scaling Factors 
Type of Bias 
Scaling Factor:  “NRP Revenues are Divided by a Factor of  __” 
RDD Sample  NPF Sample 
Non-Parametric Parametric  Non-Parametric Parametric 
Awareness  Bias  2.62 2.48  1.04 1.04 
Internal Hypothetical Bias  1.31  3.83  1.57  1.31 
External Hypothetical Bias  4.78  0.89  0.53  1.02 





Table 8. Predicted Revenue and Number of Pass Holders (Non-Parametric Estimates)  
  RDD Sample  NPF Sample 
Price 
Predicted  








Number of  
Pass Holders
NRP Revenue 
(millions of $) 
Gate Revenue
(millions of $)
15 2,698.2  40.5  139.2  42,404  0.64  0.11 
25 1,863.9  46.6  155.8  40,356  1.01  0.16 
35 1,224.9  42.9  174.8  35,601  1.25  0.30 
45  621.3 27.2 199.1  28,295  1.27  0.60 
55  514.8 27.3 204.7  21,299  1.17  0.95 
65  461.5 30.0 207.8  15,385  1.00  1.30 
75  372.8 28.0 214.1  12,795  0.96  1.48 
85  284.0 24.1 220.9  8,736 0.74  1.81 
95  266.3 25.3 222.4  7,112 0.68  1.96 
105  213.0 22.4 227.8  5,102 0.54  2.16 
115  124.3 14.3 237.7  4,097 0.47  2.27 
125  88.8 11.1  241.8  2,938  0.37 2.41 
135 53.3  7.2  246.4  2,590  0.35  2.46 
145 35.5  5.1  249.0  1,778  0.26  2.57 
155 17.8  2.8  251.6  1,198  0.19  2.66 
165 0  0  254.4  1,005 0.17 2.69 
175 0  0  254.4 812  0.14 2.72 
185 0  0  254.4 734  0.14 2.73 
195 0  0  254.4 387  0.08 2.80 
205 0  0  254.4 232  0.05 2.83 
215 0  0  254.4 232  0.05 2.83 
225 0  0  254.4 116  0.03 2.86 
235 0  0  254.4 116  0.03 2.86 
245  0  0 254.4  77 0.02  2.87 
255  0  0 254.4  77 0.02  2.87 
265 0  0  254.4  0  0  2.89 
Notes.  For simplicity, price points at the extremes of the bid range are excluded.  RDD survey data have been 
calibrated to reflect $30 million in NRP revenue at $65, based on current annual pass sales.  NPF survey data have 
been calibrated to reflect $1 million in NRP revenue at $65, based on estimated NPP and GEP sales to former 
purchasers through NPF.  Revenue and pass holder figures are calculated using the midpoint of the WTP interval.  
Households that state “YES” to both bids are assigned a WTP equal to $10 plus the highest bid.  For the RDD 
sample, 67 protest households have been omitted, leaving a sample size of N = 462.  For the NPF sample, 30 
protest households have been omitted, leaving a sample size of N = 1461.    
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